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Comment on : Electoral Contests, incumbency advantages, and campaign finance

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  • Ivan Pastine
  • Tuvana Pastine

Abstract

This paper completes Meirowitz (2008) by analyzing the effect of a cap on political campaign spending in an environment where voters have initial preferences over political candidates. The policy implications are starkly different from the previously analyzed case where voters are indifferent between candidates in the absence of campaign spending. We find that a spending cap always favors the a priori popular candidate. This result holds irrespective of whether it is the incumbent or the challenger who is able to more effectively generate and spend contributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2009. "Comment on : Electoral Contests, incumbency advantages, and campaign finance," Working Papers 200913, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucn:wpaper:200913
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/2611
    File Function: First version, 2009
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    Keywords

    Campaign finance reform; Spending limit; Expenditure limit; Incumbency advantage; Clean elections; Campaign funds; Political campaigns--Mathematical models; Voting research;

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