IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ucn/wpaper/199401.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Export enhancing tariff protection with strategic precommitment

Author

Listed:
  • Dermot Leahy

Abstract

The import protection as export promotion thesis is examined from a positive and normative perspective in a series of two-stage games in which firms choose R&D and capacity in the first stage and quantity or price in the second. It is shown (i) that a tariff affects exports in two ways; firstly, with increasing marginal cost it crowds out exports; secondly by increasing R&D and/or capacity it raises exports indirectly, (ii) when firms choose R&D and quantities a small tariff will raise welfare. This result can be reversed under Bertrand competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Dermot Leahy, 1994. "Export enhancing tariff protection with strategic precommitment," Working Papers 199401, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucn:wpaper:199401
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1950
    File Function: First version, 1994
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Protection; Export promotion; R&D; Oligopoly; Precommitment; Commercial policy--Mathematical models; Oligopolies; Exports--Mathematical models;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucn:wpaper:199401. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Nicolas Clifton (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/educdie.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.