Assessing the Impact of Public Transfers on Private Risk Sharing Arrangements. Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico
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- Marina Pavan & Aldo Colussi, 2011. "Assessing the Impact of Public Transfers on Private Risk Sharing Arrangements: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico," Working Papers 2011/05, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
- Marina Pavan & Aldo Colussi, 2008. "Assessing the Impact of Public Transfers on Private Risk Sharing Arrangements: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico," 2008 Meeting Papers 743, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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- repec:zbw:rwirep:0432 is not listed on IDEAS
- Klohn, Florian & Strupat, Christoph, 2013. "Crowding out of Solidarity? – Public Health Insurance versus Informal Transfer Networks in Ghana," Ruhr Economic Papers 432, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Florian Klohn & Christoph Strupat, 2013. "Crowding out of Solidarity? – Public Health Insurance versus Informal Transfer Networks in Ghana," Ruhr Economic Papers 0432, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
More about this item
KeywordsRisk Sharing; Limited Commitment; Crowding-out; Transfers Programsd;
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-31 (All new papers)
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