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La corruzione amministrativa in una burocrazia di tipo concorrenziale: modelli di analisi economica

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  • Amisano, Franco

    ()

Abstract

L'articolo esamina la corruzione amministrativa in una burocrazia strutturata con funzionari a giurisdizioni sovrapposte. L'analisi viene condotta ricorrendo a modelli della domanda e dell'offerta delle prestazioni fornite dai funzionari dietro versamento di tangenti. La diffusione della corruzione ed i possibili equilibri vengono poi esaminati per mezzo di modelli che introducono possibili diverse distribuzioni statistiche dei costi di corruzione per i singoli funzionari.

Suggested Citation

  • Amisano, Franco, 2002. "La corruzione amministrativa in una burocrazia di tipo concorrenziale: modelli di analisi economica," POLIS Working Papers 29, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  • Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:29
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    File URL: http://polis.unipmn.it/pubbl/RePEc/uca/ucapdv/amisano.pdf
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • P21 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform

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