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Congestión Portuaria y Racionamiento Eficiente en la Transferencia de Carga



El sistema de precios difícilmente puede eliminar la congestión en la transferencia de carga portuaria en períodos peak, pues el uso del puerto no depende tanto de factores estacionales sino que principalmente de la llegada simultánea de barcos, situación que lleva a racionar el uso de esta infraestructura. En este artículo se muestra que el racionamiento eficiente (en segundo mejor) debe hacerse de acuerdo al valor de la carga transferida más que seguir el criterio de orden de llegada o ‘first-come-first-served’. Se muestra que un racionamiento eficiente es dando prioridad a la carga en contenedores, luego a la carga fraccionada y por último a la carga en graneles. Se aplican estos resultados a la transferencia de carga en el puerto concesionado San Antonio Terminal Internacional (STI) de Chile.
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  • Claudio A Agostini & Eduardo Saavedra, 2011. "Congestión Portuaria y Racionamiento Eficiente en la Transferencia de Carga," Working Papers wp_009, Adolfo Ibáñez University, School of Government.
  • Handle: RePEc:uai:wpaper:wp_009

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    JEL classification:

    • L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis


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