Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? Evidence from the laboratory
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- Arne Robert Weiss & Irenaeus Wolff, 2013. "Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? Evidence from the laboratory," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 794-796.
- Arne Robert Weiss & Irenaeus Wolff, 2013. "Does being Elected Increase Subjective Entitlements? Evidence from the Laboratory," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-19, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
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- Gaudeul, Alexia & Keser, Claudia, 2017.
"The social preferences of democratically elected decision makers and the conflict between wealth generation and distribution,"
Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers
327, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Alexia Gaudeul & Claudia Keser, 2017. "The social preferences of democratically elected decision makers and the conflict between wealth generation and distribution," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-25, CIRANO.
- Urs Fischbacher & Simeon Schudy, 2014.
"Reciprocity and resistance to comprehensive reform,"
Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 411-428, September.
- Urs Fischbacher & Simeon Schudy, 2010. "Reciprocity and Resistance to Comprehensive Reform," TWI Research Paper Series 51, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, UniversitÃ¤t Konstanz.
- Fischbacher, Urs & Schudy, Simeon, 2013. "Reciprocity and resistance to comprehensive reform," Munich Reprints in Economics 20337, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsElections; Electoral campaigns; Dictator game; Social distance; Entitlement; Experiment;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-04-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2013-04-20 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-04-20 (Positive Political Economics)
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