IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tse/wpaper/132350.html

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice

Author

Listed:
  • Lukyanov, Georgy
  • Vlasova, Anna
  • Ziskelevich, Maria

Abstract

A failed recommendation is visible; an unproposed project is not. How should an organization pay an adviser whose private confidence determines which projects reach the margin? We show that the least-cost instrument is protection after failure rather than a success bonus. Because risky advice selects the upper tail of confidence, success pay leaks to recommendations that would occur anyway, while failure protection is concentrated at the margin. We establish unique nonpooling implementation, show that full correction is never optimal, and, while advice still needs encouragement, find confidential internal review substitutes for explicit career insurance more effectively than transparent review.

Suggested Citation

  • Lukyanov, Georgy & Vlasova, Anna & Ziskelevich, Maria, 2026. "Paying for Failure in Expert Advice," TSE Working Papers 26-1802, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:132350
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/document/wp_tse_1802.pdf
    File Function: Full Text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:132350. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tsetofr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.