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European regional policy in light of recent location theories

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  • Diego Puga

Abstract

Despite large regional policy expenditures, regional inequalities in Europe have not narrowed substantially over the last two decades, and by some measures have even widened. Income differences across States have fallen, but inequalities between regions within each State have risen. European States have developed increasingly different production structures. And European regions have also become increasingly polarised in terms of their unemployment rates. This paper describes these trends, and discusses how recent location theories can help us to explain them and reconsider the role of regional policies, and specially of transport infrastructure improvements, in such an environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Diego Puga, 2000. "European regional policy in light of recent location theories," Working Papers dpuga-00-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:dpuga-00-02
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    File URL: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/euregpol.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    regional policy; inequalities; transport infrastructure; location; Europe;

    JEL classification:

    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy
    • R40 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - General
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures

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