"4G Spectrum Auction in Japan: Japanese Package Auction (JPA)" (in Japanese)
This paper demonstrates new practical auction formats that are well tailored for the forthcoming 3.4 ~ 3.6 GHz spectrum allocation problem, which will be expected to become the first experience of spectrum auction in the Japanese society. The general term of these formats is the Japanese package auction (JPA), which is a particular form of combinatorial auction design loaded with the concept of VCG mechanism and with the devices to calm the complexity of decision making such as ascending clock auction and item division. It is important to note as an original manner of designing JPA that the Japanese government can maintain the technical neutrality concerning the competing standards of technology such as LTE-Advanced and WiMAX2 to the maximum. We explain that JPA is much better than the simultaneous multi-round ascending auction in terms of various aspects such as efficiency, incentives, and complexity.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2012|
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