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Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations


  • Hitoshi Matsushima

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)


We investigate price-based mechanisms with connectedness in combinatorial auctions, where with restrictions of privacy and complexity, the auctioneer asks a limited number of prices to buyers who provide demand responses. Consistent with the price-based property, several necessary and sufficient conditions are presented for the existence of the VCG mechanism, strategy-proofness with participation constraints, approximate strategy-proofness, Nash equilibrium, efficiency, core, and others. In all cases, the concept of the representative valuation function, which assigns the minimal valuation in both absolute and relative terms to any revealed package, plays the central role in determining whether these conditions are satisfied.

Suggested Citation

  • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-776, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  • Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2010cf776

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Ben S. Bernanke & Vincent R. Reinhart, 2004. "Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low Short-Term Interest Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 85-90, May.
    2. Robert N McCauley & Kazuo Ueda, 2009. "Government debt management at low interest rates," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, June.
    3. Cúrdia, Vasco & Woodford, Michael, 2011. "The central-bank balance sheet as an instrument of monetarypolicy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 54-79, January.
    4. Naohiko Baba & Motoharu Nakashima & Yosuke Shigemi & Kazuo Ueda, 2006. "The Bank of Japan's Monetary Policy and Bank Risk Premiums in the Money Market," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2(1), March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011. "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations," CARF F-Series CARF-F-261, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    2. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-293, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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