IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Collective Labor Supply and Housework with Non-Participation of Women in Paid Labor

Listed author(s):
  • Van Klaveren, C.
  • Maassen van den Brink, H.
  • Van Praag, B.

We estimate a collective time allocation model, where two-earner households behave as if the spouses maximize a household utility function, and where one-earner households, where only the man works, behave as if the spouses maximize a household utility function, conditional on the zero job-hour choice of the woman. We find that the shape of the individual indifference curves are mainly influenced by leisure and the household income. For one-earner households, also household production is important and this is because there are relatively more children in these households. Differences between one-earner and two-earner households seem to reflect the difference in specialization behavior of the spouses. Women in one-earner households have more bargaining power than their partner, and we find the opposite for two-earner households. The bargaining position in two-earner households is determined by the individual wages, while for one-earner households, it is determined by the wage rate of the man, the number of children and age. Finally, we evaluate how one extra hour of female labor supply influences the household and the individual utility levels, assuming that the labor supply of women may be non-optimal for both one and two-earner households. An increase of the woman's labor hours would be a Pareto improvement for two-earner households. For one-earner households, we find that an extra hour of labor is beneficial for the household and for the woman, but not for the man.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Top Institute for Evidence Based Education Research in its series Working Papers with number 28.

in new window

Date of creation: 00 2009
Handle: RePEc:tir:wpaper:28
Contact details of provider: Web page:

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tir:wpaper:28. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jessica Segal)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.