IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ten/wpaper/2026-02.html

Reporting Misconduct: The Role of Penalty Severity and Perceived Fairness

Author

Listed:
  • Quy Lam

    (University of California, Merced)

  • Ketki Sheth

    (Department of Economics, University of Tennessee)

Abstract

Deterrence theory assumes that harsher penalties reduce misconduct by raising its cost. Yet enforcement often depends on individuals who witness or respond to wrongdoing, and their behavior may also be shaped by the severity of punishment. Using a high-powered online experiment framed in a workplace setting, we test whether increasing penalties reduces willingness to report. We find that harsher penalties suppress reporting: employees are 1 percentage point less likely to report for every 10 percentage point increase in the penalty. This effect is mediated by perceived fairness: reporting declines only when penalties are seen as excessive. Despite the decrease in reporting, higher penalties still deter misconduct overall, as their direct deterrent effect outweighs the indirect increase in law-breaking caused by lower reporting rates. We also find that individuals support harsher penalties before a violation occurs, when deterrence is relevant, but prefer more lenient consequences after the offense has happened. This helps explain how policies can arise and persist in equilibrium, even when people are unwilling to enforce them in practice. These findings advance understanding of how social norms and perceptions of fairness shape the decisions of those who observe misconduct, and highlight the need to design sanctions that align with public willingness to act on violations. More severe penalties can discourage reporting, weaken enforcement, and ultimately undermine the effectiveness of deterrence mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Quy Lam & Ketki Sheth, 2026. "Reporting Misconduct: The Role of Penalty Severity and Perceived Fairness," Working Papers 2026-02, University of Tennessee, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ten:wpaper:2026-02
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://university-of-tennessee-econ.github.io/repec/pdf/2026-02.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2026
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2011. "The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 375-398, September.
    2. Armin Falk & Anke Becker & Thomas Dohmen & David Huffman & Uwe Sunde, 2023. "The Preference Survey Module: A Validated Instrument for Measuring Risk, Time, and Social Preferences," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 1935-1950, April.
    3. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2000. "Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(3), pages 227-238, March.
    4. Jeffrey V. Butler & Danila Serra & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2020. "Motivating Whistleblowers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(2), pages 605-621, February.
    5. Bjerk, David, 2005. "Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 591-625, October.
    6. Chin, Yoo-Mi & Cunningham, Scott, 2019. "Revisiting the effect of warrantless domestic violence arrest laws on intimate partner homicides," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    7. Iyengar, Radha, 2009. "Does the certainty of arrest reduce domestic violence? Evidence from mandatory and recommended arrest laws," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 85-98, February.
    8. Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, 2017. "Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 245-295.
    9. Jason Aimone & Lucas Rentschler & Vernon Smith & Bart J. Wilson, 2025. "Sympathy with resentment: Willingness to report criminal behavior depends on the punishment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 202(3), pages 343-365, March.
    10. Alexander Dyck & Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, 2010. "Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(6), pages 2213-2253, December.
    11. Anna Bindler & Randi Hjalmarsson, 2018. "How Punishment Severity Affects Jury Verdicts: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 36-78, November.
    12. Burdea, Valeria & Woon, Jonathan, 2022. "Online belief elicitation methods," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sviatschi, Maria Micaela & Trako, Iva, 2024. "Gender violence, enforcement, and human capital: Evidence from women’s justice centers in Peru," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    2. Gulesci, Selim & Leone, Marinella & Zafar, Sameen, 2026. "Domestic violence laws and social norms: Evidence from Pakistan," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    3. Jeffrey V. Butler & Danila Serra & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2020. "Motivating Whistleblowers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(2), pages 605-621, February.
    4. Mark Anderson, D. & Sabia, Joseph J. & Tekin, Erdal, 2021. "Child access prevention laws and juvenile firearm-related homicides," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    5. Black, Dan A. & Grogger, Jeffrey & Kirchmaier, Tom & Sanders, Koen, 2023. "Criminal charges, risk assessment and violent recidivism in cases of domestic abuse," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121374, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Sofia Amaral & Gordon B. Dahl & Victoria Endl-Geyer & Timo Hener & Helmut Rainer, 2023. "Deterrence or Backlash? Arrests and the Dynamics of Domestic Violence," NBER Working Papers 30855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Cristina Bellés-Obrero & Giulia La Mattina & Han Ye, 2024. "Social pensions and intimate partner violence against older women," Working Papers 2024/16, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    8. García-Ramos, Aixa, 2021. "Divorce laws and intimate partner violence: Evidence from Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    9. Alves, Guillermo & Blanchard, Pablo & Burdin, Gabriel & Chávez, Mariana & Dean, Andrés, 2022. "Like principal, like agent? Managerial preferences in employee-owned firms," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(6), pages 877-899, December.
    10. Kevin Bauer & Andrej Gill, 2024. "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Algorithmic Assessments, Transparency, and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 35(1), pages 226-248, March.
    11. Dal Bó, Pedro & Fréchette, Guillaume R. & Kim, Jeongbin, 2021. "The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 352-368.
    12. Chenlin Gu & Alvin Roth & Qingyun Wu, 2022. "Forbidden Transactions and Black Markets," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(4), pages 3084-3109, November.
    13. Maroš Servátka & Daniel Woods, 2015. "Testing Psychological Forward Induction in the Lost Wallet Game," Working Papers in Economics 15/09, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
    14. Isaac Mbiti & Danila Serra, 2022. "Health workers’ behavior, patient reporting and reputational concerns: lab-in-the-field experimental evidence from Kenya," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(2), pages 514-556, April.
    15. Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar & Konstantinos Georgalos, 2024. "Position uncertainty in a sequential public goods game: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(4), pages 820-853, September.
    16. Chiara Nardi, 2018. "Play Versus Strategy Method: Behavior and the Role of Emotions in the Ultimatum Game," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 4(1), pages 91-106, March.
    17. Simon Gaechter & Kyeongtae Lee & Martin Sefton, 2022. "The Variability of Conditional Cooperation in Sequential Prisoner's Dilemmas," Discussion Papers 2022-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    18. Elisabetta Calabresi & Núria Rodríguez-Planas, 2025. "Female empowerment and intimate partner violence," Working Papers 2025/14, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    19. Schunk, Daniel & Wagner, Valentin, 2021. "What determines the willingness to sanction violations of newly introduced social norms: Personality traits or economic preferences? evidence from the COVID-19 crisis," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    20. García-Hombrados, Jorge & Martínez-Matute, Marta & Villa, Carmen, 2024. "Specialised courts and the reporting of intimate partner violence: Evidence from Spain," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ten:wpaper:2026-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Scott Holladay (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ecutkus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.