IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/stl/stlewp/e95-2.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Impediments to Trade in Markets for Pollution Permits

Author

Listed:
  • Alistair Munro
  • Nick Hanley
  • Robin Faichney
  • Jim Shortle

Abstract

This paper considers nine possible reasons why firms might trade less often in permit markets than was expected in the early development, and consequent simulations, of the theory. Fewer trades are bad in the sense that they lead to a potential erosion of the cost-saving properties of tradeable permit systems. The first reason considered is one which has popular currency, namely that of imperfect competition in the permit market. However, we reject this as a convincing explanation. The paper then reviews eight other possible explanations; these are oligopoly in the output market; future endowments of property rights; loss aversion; asymmetric information; non-convexities in cost functions; agency problems within the firm; transactions costs; and the sequential nature of trading.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Alistair Munro & Nick Hanley & Robin Faichney & Jim Shortle, "undated". "Impediments to Trade in Markets for Pollution Permits," Working Papers Series e95/2, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:stl:stlewp:e95/2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:stl:stlewp:e95/2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Liam Delaney (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/destiuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.