IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/spo/wpmain/infohdl2441-4qghag40qc8g0r254fpopgv74r.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Algorithmes de prix, intelligence artificielle, et équilibre collusifs

Author

Listed:
  • Frédéric Marty

    (Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG))

Abstract

Les algorithmes de prix mis en œuvre par des firmes concurrentes peuvent constituer le support de collusions. Les ressources offertes par le Big Data, les possibilités d’ajustement des prix en temps réel et l’analyse prédictive peuvent permettre d’atteindre rapidement et de maintenir durablement des équilibres de collusion tacite. Le recours à l’intelligence artificielle pose un enjeu spécifique en ce sens que l’algorithme peut découvrir de lui-même l’intérêt d’un accord tacite de non-agression et que l’analyse de son processus décisionnel est particulièrement difficile. Ce faisant la sanction de l’entente sur la base du droit des pratiques anticoncurrentielles ne va pas de soi. L’article explore donc les voies de régulation possibles, que celles-ci passent par des audits ou par l’activation de règles de responsabilité.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Marty, 2017. "Algorithmes de prix, intelligence artificielle, et équilibre collusifs," Sciences Po publications 2017-14, Sciences Po.
  • Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4qghag40qc8g0r254fpopgv74r
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/4qghag40qc8g0r254fpopgv74r/resources/wp2017-14-algorithmesdeprix-fmarty.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Algorithmes des prix; Intelligence artificielle; Collusion tacite; Règles de responsabilité; Régles de concurrence;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4qghag40qc8g0r254fpopgv74r. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Spire @ Sciences Po Library). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ecspofr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.