IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/spe/cpaper/0632.html

Revenue Sharing and Owner Profits in Professional Team Sports

Author

Listed:
  • Stefan Késenne

    (University of Antwerp
    Catholic University of Leuven)

Abstract

In the sports economics literature, little attention has been paid to the impact of revenue sharing on club owners' profits. In particular, it is unclear how the profits of the large-budget clubs are affected. In this article, the relationship between one specific revenue-sharing arrangement and owner profits is investigated for clubs in a profit-maximization league using two different models. In a Walrasian equilibrium model, revenue sharing will lower profits, whatever the value of the share parameter, if the profits of a large-budget club are higher than the average club budget in the league. In a noncooperative Nash equilibrium model, the impact turns out to be theoretically indeterminate.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Késenne, 2006. "Revenue Sharing and Owner Profits in Professional Team Sports," IASE Conference Papers 0632, International Association of Sports Economists.
    • Handle: RePEc:spe:cpaper:0632
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Duane Rockerbie & Stephen Easton, 2018. "Revenue Sharing in Major League Baseball: The Moments That Meant so Much," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 6(3), pages 1-16, August.
    3. Peter J. Sloane, 2015. "The Economics of Professional Football Revisited," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 62(1), pages 1-7, February.
    4. Duane W. Rockerbie, 2024. "Does the Dual Representation System of Player Agents in International Football Benefit Players? An Economic Analysis," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 25(7), pages 827-843, October.
    5. Thomas Peeters, 2015. "Profit-Maximizing Gate Revenue Sharing In Sports Leagues," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 1275-1291, April.
    6. Rockerbie, Duane & Easton, Stephen, 2017. "Risk Diversification from Revenue Sharing in a Professional Sports League: Measuring Welfare Gains," MPRA Paper 77431, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Miceli, Thomas J., 2024. "Patent races and pennant races: A new rationale for revenue sharing in sports leagues," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
    8. Rockerbie, Duane & Easton, Stephen, 2017. "Revenue Sharing in Professional Sports Leagues as a Hedge for Exchange Rate Risk," MPRA Paper 77428, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Peter Sloane, 2014. "Club objectives," Chapters, in: John Goddard & Peter Sloane (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Professional Football, chapter 1, pages 13-22, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    JEL classification:

    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spe:cpaper:0632. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Victor Matheson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iaseeea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.