Two Folk Manipulability Theorems In Two-Sided Matching Markets
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Keywordsmatching; Stable payoff; competitive equilibrium payoff; optimal stable payoff;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-11-17 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-11-17 (Microeconomics)
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