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On the Economics of Integrated Ticketing

Author

Listed:
  • Jolian McHardy

    (Department of Economics, The University of Sheffield)

  • Michael Reynolds
  • Stephen Trotter

Abstract

In this paper we explore alternative pricing and regulatory strategies within a simple transport network with Cournot duopoly and differentiated demands. We show that whilst firms always prefer to offer integrated ticketing, a social planner will not. With integrated ticketing, the firms always prefer complete collusion but there is not a uniform ranking of some of the less collusive regimes. Society generally prefers the less collusive regimes to complete collusion but prefers some collusion to independent pricing.

Suggested Citation

  • Jolian McHardy & Michael Reynolds & Stephen Trotter, 2005. "On the Economics of Integrated Ticketing," Working Papers 2005006, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2005.
    • Handle: RePEc:shf:wpaper:2005006
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    File URL: http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/03/91/72/SERP2005006.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2005
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://www.shef.ac.uk/content/1/c6/03/91/72/SERP2005006.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2005
    Download Restriction: no
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Integrated ticketing; duopoly; collusion.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy

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