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Optimal leniency programe for cartel abuses - an US and European perspective

Author

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  • Aleksander Maziarz

    () (Kozminski University)

Abstract

Leniency is a program which gives immunity from fines or reduction of fines in cartel cases for those companies which decide to cooperate with antitrust agencies. The leniency program significantly reduces the difficulties, time and administrative costs of evidence of cartel violations, as the antitrust bodies receives assistance through leniency applications and further cooperation of cartel participant during the administrative procedure. Thanks to this, the antitrust bodies can detect and punish more cartels focusing on other abuses.Recently leniency programs are being misused because the same companies apply for leniency many times without being punished. Therefore, the program needs changes. The paper analyses US and European leniency programs and tries to find optimal solution for elimination of misuse of leniency.

Suggested Citation

  • Aleksander Maziarz, 2018. "Optimal leniency programe for cartel abuses - an US and European perspective," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences 6709856, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:sek:iacpro:6709856
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    File URL: https://iises.net/proceedings/41st-international-academic-conference-venice/table-of-content/detail?cid=67&iid=023&rid=9856
    File Function: First version, 2018
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cartel; restrictive agreement; leniency; immunity form fines;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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