Mixed Markets with Public Goods
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pesce, Marialaura, 2014. "The veto mechanism in atomic differential information economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 33-45.
- Maria Graziano & Maria Romaniello, 2012.
"Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 269-303, February.
- Maria Gabriella Graziano & Maria Romaniello, 2010. "Linear Cost Share Equilibria and the Veto Power of the Grand Coalition," CSEF Working Papers 248, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
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KeywordsMixed markets; coalitional fairness; envy; efficiency; asymmetric information;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-10-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-PBE-2010-10-23 (Public Economics)
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