Efficient Allocations in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Economy
We study a dynamic general equilibrium model with production, in which a representative agent chooses an unobservable effort level. We cast the problem as a continuous time principal agent model. We study the problem of a central planner (the principal) choosing optimal allocations of consumption and effort for the representative agent (the agent). When effort is observed, the full information problem results in the standard optimal growth solution. When the principal cannot observe effort, but can observe consumption, optimal allocations can be found via a contract which conditions on the agent's continuation utility. In each case, we characterize the optimal contract via a first-order approach, relying on results in Williams (2004). We then examine the impact of incentive constraints on equilibrium consumption and output dynamics and asset prices
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|Date of creation:||11 Nov 2005|
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|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://comp-econ.org/|
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