Efficient Allocations in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Economy
I analyze the implications of moral hazard in dynamic economy with production. In particular, I add agency frictions to a benchmark stochastic growth model, by assuming that firms observe output but hours worked and productivity are unobservable. I cast the problem as a continuous time principal agent model and study the contracting problem that results. I solve for the optimal contract using some recent results on the validity of the first-order approach in continuous time, which makes the analysis tractable. I show that the dynamic agency frictions introduce both a "labor wedge" which distorts the allocation of labor within a period and an "intertemporal wedge" distorting the allocation of consumption over time. I analyze the quantitative importance of moral hazard in this economy for consumption and output dynamics and asset prices.
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|Date of creation:||03 Dec 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
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