IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Testing for Asymmetric Dynamic Oligopoly Models


  • Ralph Siebert and Christine Zulehner


In this paper, we specify a theoretical dynamic oligopoly model with regard to asymmetric firms. We then estimate a structural dynamic model of demand and pricing relations for the semiconductor industry. Using quarterly firm-level output and cost data as well as industry prices from 1974 to 1996, we estimate whether market conduct is symmetric or asymmetric, and how different groups of firms behave in the product market. We also control for other industry characteristics, such as multiproduct firms, learning by doing,\\ economies of scale, and spillover effects. The effects are also allowed to vary over the product life cycle. The main result of the paper shows, that in contrast to previous findings or assumptions, market conduct and mark-ups are asymmetric. Large firms behave like Cournot players, whereas small firms behave as if in perfect competition, indicating that they charge prices close to overall marginal costs. Consequently, small firms behave like price takers, which is a very reasonable result, as their small size does not allow for having an impact on market price. Moreover, we provide evidence for the multiproduct firm's character, learning and economies of scale effects. Finally, we provide evidence that a firm's current output and the rivals' output in the future are intertemporal strategic substitutes.

Suggested Citation

  • Ralph Siebert and Christine Zulehner, 2001. "Testing for Asymmetric Dynamic Oligopoly Models," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 182, Society for Computational Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf1:182

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Rama Cont & Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, 1997. "Herd behavior and aggregate fluctuations in financial markets," Science & Finance (CFM) working paper archive 500028, Science & Finance, Capital Fund Management.
    2. Dan Ashlock & Mark D. Smucker & E. Ann Stanley & Leigh Tesfatsion, 1995. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," Game Theory and Information 9501002, EconWPA, revised 20 Jan 1995.
    3. Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit, 2003. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-85, April.
    4. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
    5. Michael D. Cohen & Rick L. Riolo & Robert Axelrod, 1999. "The Emergence of Social Organization in the Prisoner's Dilemma: How Context-Preservation and Other Factors Promote Cooperation," Working Papers 99-01-002, Santa Fe Institute.
    6. repec:cup:macdyn:v:4:y:2000:i:2:p:170-96 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Alan Kirman, 1993. "Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 137-156.
    8. Young, H.P., 1999. "Diffusion in Social Networks," Papers 2, Brookings Institution - Working Papers.
    9. Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2000. "Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 239-262, October.
    10. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, January.
    11. Hirshlifer, David & Rassmusen, Eric, 1989. "Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, August.
    12. Cont, Rama & Bouchaud, Jean-Philipe, 2000. "Herd Behavior And Aggregate Fluctuations In Financial Markets," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(02), pages 170-196, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Industrial Organization;

    JEL classification:

    • C1 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L6 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sce:scecf1:182. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.