IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/sce/scecf1/172.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Bounded Rationality and Social Cognition: A Computational Study

Author

Listed:
  • Robert Hoffmann

Abstract

This paper examines the implications of a 'strong' version of bounded rationality popular within computational and evolutionary game theory in which agents are represented by finite automata. It is argued that this view has unrealistic features in that agents of this kind are unable to distinguish between opponent or game types. An alternative view of bounded rationality from social cognition accommodating opponent-specific choices is presented and analyzed by computer simulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Hoffmann, 2001. "Bounded Rationality and Social Cognition: A Computational Study," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 172, Society for Computational Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf1:172
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/~lizrh2/hoffmann.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rama Cont & Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, 1997. "Herd behavior and aggregate fluctuations in financial markets," Science & Finance (CFM) working paper archive 500028, Science & Finance, Capital Fund Management.
    2. Dan Ashlock & Mark D. Smucker & E. Ann Stanley & Leigh Tesfatsion, 1995. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," Game Theory and Information 9501002, EconWPA, revised 20 Jan 1995.
    3. Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit, 2003. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-85, April.
    4. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
    5. Michael D. Cohen & Rick L. Riolo & Robert Axelrod, 1999. "The Emergence of Social Organization in the Prisoner's Dilemma: How Context-Preservation and Other Factors Promote Cooperation," Working Papers 99-01-002, Santa Fe Institute.
    6. repec:cup:macdyn:v:4:y:2000:i:2:p:170-96 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Alan Kirman, 1993. "Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 137-156.
    8. Young, H.P., 1999. "Diffusion in Social Networks," Papers 2, Brookings Institution - Working Papers.
    9. Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2000. "Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 239-262, October.
    10. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, January.
    11. Hirshlifer, David & Rassmusen, Eric, 1989. "Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, August.
    12. Cont, Rama & Bouchaud, Jean-Philipe, 2000. "Herd Behavior And Aggregate Fluctuations In Financial Markets," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(02), pages 170-196, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bounded rationality; social cognition; genetic algorithm;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sce:scecf1:172. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sceeeea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.