Strategic Interaction in A Stock Trading Chat Room
We consider a model of an internet chat room with free entry but secure identity. Traders exchange messages in real time of both a fundamental and non-fundamental nature. We explore conditions under which traders post truthful information and make trading decisions. We also establish a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which momentum traders profit from their exposure to informed traders in the chat room. The model generates a number of empirical predictions: (1) the non-skillful traders follow the skillful traders; (2) the more skillful traders are more frequently followed by others; (3) the non-skillful traders benefit from following. We test and confirm all three predictions using a data set of chat room logs from the Activetrader Financial Chat Room.
|Date of creation:||16 Jul 2013|
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