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К Теории Рынков . Статья 2. Социодинамическое Описание Рынков Опекаемых Благ
[On the Theory of 'Patronized Goods' Markets. 2nd article. Sociodynamic Description of Patronized Goods Markets]


  • Rubinstein Alexander Yakovlevich


В данной статье продолжен анализ рынка опекаемых благ. Автор предлагает свою трактовку проблемы с позиций концепции социодинамики. Дается краткая характеристика этой концепции; повторяется цепочка последовательных шагов построения обобщенной модели Викселля-Линдаля применительно к рынку опекаемых благ. Автор делает вывод, что государство не должно имитировать поведение мецената, а будучи важнейшим институтом общества, выступать за коллективные интересы, реализация которых предполагает опеку некоторых товаров и услуг The article represents a continuation of patronized goods market analysis. The author proposes his interpretation of the problem in the light of sociodynamics conception, whose brief description is given. The chain of successive steps in building a generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model applied to patronized goods market is reproduced. The author draws the conclusion that the state should not imitate patron's behavior, but, being a most important institute of society, should be 'responsible' for collective interests, whose realization presupposes the protection of selected goods and services

Suggested Citation

  • Rubinstein Alexander Yakovlevich, 2008. "К Теории Рынков . Статья 2. Социодинамическое Описание Рынков Опекаемых Благ
    [On the Theory of 'Patronized Goods' Markets. 2nd article. Sociodynamic Description of Patronized Goods Markets]
    ," Working papers y:2009:a:pru175:n:2, Institute of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:rua:wpaper:y:2009:a:pru175:n:2

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    More about this item


    Patronized goods; normative interests; market failures; public goods; merit goods; Baumol economy; patronized goods markets; Economic Sociodynamics; competitive equilibrium; Pareto optimum; equilibrium model for patronized goods; subsidies; transfers; public priorities; social policy;

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods


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