Bargaining coalitions in the agricultural negotiations of the Doha Round: similarity of interests or strategic choices? An empirical assessment
The paper aims at understanding the structural features of the bargaining coalition in the Doha Round of the WTO. We provide an empirical assessment of the preferences of each negotiating actor looking at general economics indicators, development levels, structure of the agriculural sectors, and trade policies for agriculural products. Bargaining coalitions are analyzed by grouping countries through a cluster analysis procedure. The clusters are compared with existing coalitions, in order to assess their degree of possible "defectors", i.e. countries that according to their economic conditions and policies seem to be relatively less committed to the positions of the coalition they join.
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