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Dynamic Deterence Theory

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  • Leung, S.F.

Abstract

Economic theories of deterrence have primarily been built on static models. A common and serious shortcoming of the existing dynamic deterrence models is the assumption of a two-period structure that ignores recidivism. The aims of this paper are to formulate and solve a general dynamic deterrence model that incorporates recidivistic behavior, to explore its implications, and to derive some testable predictions. The analysis shows how the value and the intensity, engaging in illegal activity change over time, highlights the weaknesses of two-period deterrence models and compares the deterrent effectiveness of increasing the likelihood of punishment versus the severity of punishment. Finally, the recidivistic model provides a structural foundation for the widely used stochastic-process models of crime in operations research and criminology. Copyright 1995 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Leung, S.F., 1993. "Dynamic Deterence Theory," RCER Working Papers 366, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  • Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:366
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Makowsky, 2006. "An Agent-Based Model of Mortality Shocks, Intergenerational Effects, and Urban Crime," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 9(2), pages 1-7.
    2. Wang, Shoou-Jiun & Batta, Rajan & Rump, Christopher M., 2005. "Stability of a crime level equilibrium," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 229-244, September.
    3. Alexandre Carvalho & Daniel Cerqueira & Waldir Lobão, 2005. "Socioeconomic Structure, Self-Fuifilment, Homicides and Spatial Dependence in Brazil," Discussion Papers 1105, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA.
    4. Mohamed Jellal & Nuno Garoupa, 1999. "Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning," Economics Working Papers 402, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    5. Fabel, Oliver & Meier, Volker, 1999. "Optimal parole decisions1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 159-166, June.
    6. BRYAN C. McCANNON, 2009. "Differentiating Between First And Repeat Offenses," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(1), pages 76-85, January.
    7. repec:spr:joptap:v:176:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10957-017-1208-y is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Persson, Mats & Siven, Claes-Henric, 2006. "Incentive and incarceration effects in a general equilibrium model of crime," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 214-229, February.
    9. Kenneth Avio, 1998. "The Economics of Prisons," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 143-175, September.
    10. Volker Meier, 2001. "On Prison and Therapy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 47-56, July.
    11. Been-Lon Chen, 2003. "Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 381-403, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    law ; economic models ; crimes;

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