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Unanimous Constitutional Consent and the Immigration Problem

Author

Listed:
  • Josten, Stefan D.

    () (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg)

  • Zimmermann, Klaus W.

    () (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg)

Abstract

This paper utilizes the cross-cutting cleavages approach to evaluate the probability of a unanimous constitutional consent and, based on these results, discusses the implications of immigration on an existing constitutional consent. It is shown that previous conclusions of beneficial effects stemming from a multitude of political dimensions for a unanimous constitutional consent crucially depend on the assumption of an extreme mode of intrapersonal compensation of constitutional majority and minority preferences. These conclusions are reversed once you consider more restrictive schemes of such intrapersonal compensation. Since, furthermore, the probability of constitutional consent unambiguously falls with a growing size of the collectivity, only a policy of selective and controlled immigration will be able to guarantee with regard to the existing cleavages of a society that the existing constitutional consent will not be damaged or destroyed, whereas uncontrolled immigration, possibly based on ethical norms, will risk the breakdown of any constitutional consent in a society.

Suggested Citation

  • Josten, Stefan D. & Zimmermann, Klaus W., 2004. "Unanimous Constitutional Consent and the Immigration Problem," Working Paper 31/2004, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2004_031
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Annick Laruelle & Mika Widgrén, 1998. "Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 317-339, March.
    2. Sutter, Matthias, 2000. "Flexible Integration, EMU and Relative Voting Power in the EU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 41-62, July.
    3. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-464, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Horgos & Klaus Zimmermann, 2009. "Interest groups and economic performance: some new evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 301-315, March.
    2. Benjamin Powell, 2012. "Coyote ugly: the deadweight cost of rent seeking for immigration policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 195-208, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

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