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Did Video Kill the Radio Star? The Endgame of a Ten-Year War Between LawTalk and the Korean Bar Association

Author

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  • Hong Lee

    (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade)

Abstract

Digitization has enabled two-sided platforms to reshape search and access in professional service markets long coordinated by incumbent associations. This paper examines the decade-long conflict between LawTalk and the Korean Bar Association and places it in comparative perspective with similar disputes in real estate, tax services, telemedicine, and mobility. Building on two-sided market theory, differentiated-product competition, and recent empirical evidence from Korea’s legal-services market, the paper argues that platform entry in credence-goods markets tends to expand demand by reducing search friction and widening the product space rather than merely reallocating existing demand. The LawTalk case demonstrates how a regulatory shift, from exclusion toward coexistence, can allow for lawful intermediation while maintaining core professional norms. The paper concludes that policy should govern the interface through transparency, auditability, and a clear separation between advertising and professional services, instead of categorical restrictions that reduce access without welfare gains.

Suggested Citation

  • Hong Lee, 2026. "Did Video Kill the Radio Star? The Endgame of a Ten-Year War Between LawTalk and the Korean Bar Association," Industrial Economic Review 022560, Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:kieter:022560
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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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