The Inefficiency of Refinancing: Why Prepayment Penalties Are Good for Risky Borrowers
This paper explores the practice of mortgage refinancing in a dynamic competitive lending model with risky borrowers and costly default. We show that the prepayment penalties are welfare improving, and that they are more beneficial to borrowers with higher risk of default. The empirical evidence supports the assumptions and predictions of the model, including higher sensitivity of refinancing decisions of more risky borrowers with respect to the ex-post changes in their creditworthiness and that, conditional on the borrower's type, the mortgages with prepayment penalties have lower premia, the more so the more risky is the borrower. These results suggest that the legislation banning refinancing penalties might have unintended consequences. Instead of protecting would-be homeowners from predatory lending, the new law might end up protecting them from credit.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed008:998. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.