Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
In this paper we consider a number of different ways that a sequence of discrete-time repeated games can approach a continuous-time limit. Our purpose is to clarify the effects of three different factors: 1) The distribution of signals in a fixed discrete-time game, 2) How the distribution (and notably its variance) changes with the period length, and 3) whether some of the player roles are filled by sequences of short-run players
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||03 Dec 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed006:680. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.