Public Provision of Private Goods
We consider an environment with asymmetric information about preferences for a public good and a private good. If the public good must be financed from contributions made by participants and if participants must be given incentives to participate in the mechanism, we show that there are circumstances when the private good should be bundled with the public good, in spite of the. We interpret this as an efficiency rationale for public provision of private goods
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|Date of creation:||2004|
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