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Marques de distribution et rapports de force entre producteurs et distributeurs

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  • Caprice, S.

Abstract

The analysis of the allocation of market power between producers and retailers can not be dissociated from possible switch between brands within store or between stores within brand. The product line differentiation between retailers may then be the result from this allocation of market power between upstream and downstream firms. We determine conditions for which a manufacturer competing with store brands restricts its sales on one retailer or, on the contrary, uses all channels of sale. ...French Abstract : L'analyse des rapports de force entre l'amont et l'aval ne peut être dissociée des éventuels reports de consommation entre produits ou entre enseignes de distribution lorsqu'un produit vient à manquer chez un distributeur. La différenciation entre distributeurs par la gamme de produits offerts peut alors être le résultat de ces rapports de force. L'auteur détermine les conditions sous lesquelles un producteur concurrencé par des marques de distribution a intérêt à concentrer ses débouchés ou au contraire à diversifier ses débouchés.

Suggested Citation

  • Caprice, S., 2001. "Marques de distribution et rapports de force entre producteurs et distributeurs," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 29, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse).
  • Handle: RePEc:rea:inrawp:29
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    File URL: http://www.toulouse.inra.fr/centre/esr/wpRePEc/cap200118.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS; STORE BRAND; PRODUCT LINE DIFFERENTIATION; MARKET POWER; DISCRIMINATION ; MARQUE DE DISTRIBUTEUR; DIFFERENCIATION DES PRODUITS; RELATION INDUSTRIE DISTRIBUTION;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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