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Faut-il ou non interdire la discrimination ?

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  • Caprice, S.

Abstract

In this paper, we explain the ambiguous impact of a rule of non-discrimination on the relationships between manufacturers and retailers. We show that such a rule has two conflicting effects on the Formation and the sharing of profits between upstream and downstream firms. We study these elements taking into account the development of own brands by retailers or more commonly the presence of alternate sources of supply. We show that a rule of non-discrimination effectively improves the profit of a producer, but can reduce the wholesale prices and the final prices. Such a rule, when the goods are stongly substitutes, implies a decrease of retailers' profits. ...French Abstract : Cet article montre dans le cadre des relations entre producteurs et distributeurs qu'une règle de non-discrimination exerce des effets opposés sur la formation et le partage du profit entre les secteurs amont et aval. L'auteur propose un modèle permettant d'appréhender ces éléments en prenant explicitement en compte la présence de marques de distributeurs ou, plus généralement, de sources alternatives d'approvisionnement. Il montre, en particulier, qu'une règle de non-discrimination renforce effectivement le pouvoir de marché d'un fournisseur, mais ne conduit pas nécessairement à une augmentation des prix de gros et des prix de détail. Par ailleurs, une telle règle peut permettre de réduire le pouvoir de négociation des distributeurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Caprice, S., 2001. "Faut-il ou non interdire la discrimination ?," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 27, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse).
  • Handle: RePEc:rea:inrawp:27
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    File URL: http://www.toulouse.inra.fr/centre/esr/wpRePEc/cap200114.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache & Jean-Paul Chavas & Tom Cox & Vincent Réquillart, 2002. "EU Dairy Policy Reform and Future WTO Negotiations: a Spatial Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 233-257.
    2. L. J. Hubbard, 1992. "Two-Tier Pricing For Milk: A Re-Examination," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 343-354.
    3. Chavas, Jean-Paul & Cox, Thomas L. & Jesse, Edward, 1998. "Spatial allocation and the shadow pricing of product characteristics," Agricultural Economics of Agricultural Economists, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 18(1), January.
    4. Snow, Arthur & Warren, Ronald Jr., 1996. "The marginal welfare cost of public funds: Theory and estimates," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 289-305, August.
    5. Burrell, Alison, 1985. "Price Uncertainty under EC Milk Quotas," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 12(4), pages 335-350.
    6. Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache & Jean-Paul Chavas & Thomas L. Cox & Vincent Réquillart, 2002. "Partial Market Liberalization and the Efficiency of Policy Reform: The Case of the European Dairy Sector," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 84(4), pages 1003-1020.
    7. Thomas L. Cox & Jean-Paul Chavas, 2001. "An Interregional Analysis of Price Discrimination and Domestic Policy Reform in the U.S. Dairy Sector," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(1), pages 89-106.
    8. Oskam, Arie, 1989. "Principles of the EC Dairy Model," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 16(4), pages 463-497.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    MULTILATERAL VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS; STORE BRAND; DISCRIMINATION; NONDISCRIMINATION ; RELATION INDUSTRIE DISTRIBUTION; MARQUE DE DISTRIBUTEUR; CONTRAT; DISTRIBUTION;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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