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Faut-il ou non interdire la discrimination ?


  • Caprice, S.


In this paper, we explain the ambiguous impact of a rule of non-discrimination on the relationships between manufacturers and retailers. We show that such a rule has two conflicting effects on the Formation and the sharing of profits between upstream and downstream firms. We study these elements taking into account the development of own brands by retailers or more commonly the presence of alternate sources of supply. We show that a rule of non-discrimination effectively improves the profit of a producer, but can reduce the wholesale prices and the final prices. Such a rule, when the goods are stongly substitutes, implies a decrease of retailers' profits. ...French Abstract : Cet article montre dans le cadre des relations entre producteurs et distributeurs qu'une règle de non-discrimination exerce des effets opposés sur la formation et le partage du profit entre les secteurs amont et aval. L'auteur propose un modèle permettant d'appréhender ces éléments en prenant explicitement en compte la présence de marques de distributeurs ou, plus généralement, de sources alternatives d'approvisionnement. Il montre, en particulier, qu'une règle de non-discrimination renforce effectivement le pouvoir de marché d'un fournisseur, mais ne conduit pas nécessairement à une augmentation des prix de gros et des prix de détail. Par ailleurs, une telle règle peut permettre de réduire le pouvoir de négociation des distributeurs.

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  • Caprice, S., 2001. "Faut-il ou non interdire la discrimination ?," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 27, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse).
  • Handle: RePEc:rea:inrawp:27

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    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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