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Competition policy and agreements between firms


  • Bergès-Sennou, F.
  • Loss, F.
  • Malavoti, E.
  • Vergé, T.


The European Commission recently considered abolishing the notification system and focusing on a regime of ex-post investigations. Our objective is to show that a better understanding of markets can justify this reform. Whe the precision of the Competition Authority's analysis is not high enough, a ex-ante control, like the notification system, is preferable. On the other hand, if the decision accuracy improves, an ex-post investigation regime achieves a higher social welfare. ...French Abstract : La Commission Européenne a récemment décidé de mettre fin au système de notifications et de recentrer ses activités sur un régime d'enquêtes. L'objectif des auteurs est de montrer qu'une meilleure connaissance des marchés justifie une telle réforme. Lorsque l'analyse des dossiers faite par l'Aurorité de la Concurrence n'est pas suffisamment minutieuse, un controle ex-ante est préférable (comme le système des notifications). En revanche, quand la qualité de jugement s'améliore, un régime ex-post d'enquêtes permet d'atteindre un surplus social plus élevé.

Suggested Citation

  • Bergès-Sennou, F. & Loss, F. & Malavoti, E. & Vergé, T., 2001. "Competition policy and agreements between firms," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 22, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse).
  • Handle: RePEc:rea:inrawp:22

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    Cited by:

    1. Le Pape, Nicolas & Zhao, Kai, 2014. "Horizontal mergers and uncertainty," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 8, pages 1-31.
    2. Marcel Canoy & Patrick Rey & Eric van Damme, 2004. "Dominance and Monopolization," Chapters,in: The International Handbook of Competition, chapter 7 Edward Elgar Publishing.

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    JEL classification:

    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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