Existence of Perfect Equilibria: A Direct Proof
We formulate and prove a modification of Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed-point theorem, which is a generalization of Kakutani’s theorem. It enables us to provide a direct proof of the existence of perfect equilibria in finite normal form games and extensive games with perfect recall. We construct a correspondence whose fixed points are precisely the perfect equilibria of a given finite game. Existence of a fixed point is secured by the modified version of Eilenberg-Montgomery theorem.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/programs/phd
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1226. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Krannert PHD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.