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When Should Bankruptcy Law Be Creditor- or Debtor-Friendly: Theory and Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • David Schoenherr

    (Princeton University)

  • Jan Starmans

    (Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

We examine how creditor protection affects firms with different levels of owners’ and man- agers’ personal costs of bankruptcy. Theoretically, we show that firms with high personal costs of bankruptcy borrow and invest more under a more debtor-friendly management stay system, whereas firms with low personal costs of bankruptcy borrow and invest more under a more creditor-friendly receivership system. Intuitively, stronger creditor protection relaxes financial constraints but reduces credit demand. Which effect dominates depends on owners’ and managers’ personal costs of bankruptcy. Empirically, we find support for these predictions using a Korean bankruptcy reform, which replaced receivership with management stay.

Suggested Citation

  • David Schoenherr & Jan Starmans, 2021. "When Should Bankruptcy Law Be Creditor- or Debtor-Friendly: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 2020-43, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    • Handle: RePEc:pri:econom:2020-43
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bankruptcy; personal costs of bankruptcy; investment; law and economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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