IDE et retards d'investissement de l'entreprise domestique au Sénégal : une solution par la gouvernance d'entreprise
[FDI and Senegalese domestic firms investment delays : a corporate governance solution]
This paper focuses on agency theory to explain investment behavior difference between private domestic and foreign in Senegalese industry. We put domestic companies into two groups with regard to managerial ownership and institutional ownership. An augmented accelerator model with demand uncertainty is used for that purpose. Empirical checkings have been performed using in panel of 187 firms. The results reveal that investment sensibility to uncertainty, sales and free cash flow is higher in foreign firms. Considering the efforts made by these firms in developing countries to meet international standards, our second area of research proposes managerial ownership to mitigate investment delays of domestic firms. It is showed that domestic firms can benefit from a high sensibility to uncertainty, be less financially constrained and less subject to underinvestment (due to manager extraction funds). A reduction of behavioral delays could be reached via optimal managerial ownership (within 5%-25%); none institutional ownership also improve domestic firms investment.
|Date of creation:||30 Jan 2008|
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