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Fines for Failure to Cooperate within Antitrust Proceedings – the Ultimate Weapon..


  • Stolarski, Konrad


The aim of this article is to analyse a powerful competence available to antitrust authorities in Europe in the form of the imposition of fines for the failure to cooperate within antitrust proceedings. While fines of that type are imposed in practice very rarely, the article considers the existing decisional practice of the Polish antitrust authority as well as the European Commission, and presents the way in which their approach has evolved throughout the years. The article analyses also the question of the formal initiation of proceedings concerning procedural violations and the importance of the use of a uniform and fair approach towards the scrutinized undertakings, especially as fine graduation is concerned. For that purpose, the article provides also a comparative analysis of past proceedings conducted by the European Commission and selected judgments of EU Courts.

Suggested Citation

  • Stolarski, Konrad, 2011. "Fines for Failure to Cooperate within Antitrust Proceedings – the Ultimate Weapon..," MPRA Paper 38523, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38523

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1987. "The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-48, March.
    2. Banerji, Sanjay & Gupta, Manas Ranjan, 1997. "The efficiency wage given long-run employment and concave labor constraint," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 185-195, June.
    3. Solow, Robert M., 1979. "Another possible source of wage stickiness," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 79-82.
    4. Lin, Chung-cheng & Lai, Ching-chong, 1994. "The turnover costs and the Solow condition in an efficiency wage model with intertemporal optimization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 501-505, August.
    5. Ramaswamy, Ramana & Rowthorn, Robert E, 1991. "Efficiency Wages and Wage Dispersion," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(232), pages 501-514, November.
    6. Schmidt-Sorensen, Jan Beyer, 1990. "The equilibrium effort-wage elasticity in efficiency-wage models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 365-369, April.
    7. Jellal, Mohamed & Zenou, Yves, 1999. "Efficiency wages and the quality of job matching," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 201-217, June.
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    More about this item


    fines; antitrust proceedings; dawn raid; inspection; cooperation; procedural infringements;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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