IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Agreement theorems with interactive information: possibilities and impossibilities


  • Tarbush, Bassel


Following from Tarbush (2011a), we explore the implications of using two different definitions of informativeness over kens; one that ranks objective, and the other subjective information. With the first, we create a new semantic operation that allows us to derive agreement theorems even when decision functions are based on interactive information (for any r ≥ 0). Effectively, this operation, unlike information cell union captures the notion of an agent becoming “more ignorant” for all modal depths. Using the definition that ranks subjective information however, we show an impossibility result: In generic models, agreement theorems using the standard Sure-Thing Principle do not hold when decision functions depend on interactive information (when r > 0).

Suggested Citation

  • Tarbush, Bassel, 2011. "Agreement theorems with interactive information: possibilities and impossibilities," MPRA Paper 32850, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32850

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL:
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL:
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    Agreeing to disagree; knowledge; common knowledge; belief; information; epistemic logic;

    JEL classification:

    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32850. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.