IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/28832.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Tarım Politikasındaki Değişiklikler ve Bağcılık: Çanakkale ili Örneği
[Improvements in Agricultural Policy in Turkey and Case Study of Viniculture in Çanakkale Province]

Author

Listed:
  • Aktas, Erkan
  • Tan, Sibel

Abstract

Bağcılılık Türkiye’nin en önemli tarımsal alanların başında gelmektedir. Bağcılık Türkiye’de üreticinin geçimi için önemli bir rol oynamakla birlikte ülke ekonomisine de önemli katkılar sağlamaktadır. Bu çalışmada öncelikle dünyada ve Türkiye’de bağ alanlarının ve üretimin dağılımı, dış ticaret miktarları, bağcılığa alternatif olan zeytin ekim alanları ve üretiminin dağılımı, dünyada ve Türkiye’de şarap üretimi ve dış ticareti, bağcılıkla ilgili destekleme ve fiyat politikaları, son olarak da Çanakkale ilinde bağcılığın mevcut durumu incelenmiştir. Küreselleşme ile birlikte, bağcılıkta diğer tarım ürünlerini gibi son dönem tarım politikalarındaki değişmeden etkilenmiştir. Özellikle 2001 yılından sonra tarım politikasından ön plana çıkan DGD sistemi, ürün destekleri, özelleştirme, girdi ve çıktı fiyatlarındaki değişmelerin, bağ alanları üzerindeki etkileri tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Türkiye’de tarımda destek politikaları oluşturulurken çok yönlü etkileri gözardı edilmektedir. Bunlara son dönem yapılan özelleştirme politikaları ile birlikte yapılan tarımsal desteklemelerin etkisinin azalması örnek gösterilebilir. Ürün bazlı tarım destekleri ve DGD politikaları oluşturulurken, ürünler arasındaki tamamlayıcı veya ikame ürün ilişkisi, ve bunların girdi ve çıktı fiyat ve miktarları ön planda tutulmalıdır. Özellikle bağcılık ile ilgili destekleme politikaları oluşturulurken zeytine yapılan destek politikalarına da dikkat edilmelidir.

Suggested Citation

  • Aktas, Erkan & Tan, Sibel, 2007. "Tarım Politikasındaki Değişiklikler ve Bağcılık: Çanakkale ili Örneği
    [Improvements in Agricultural Policy in Turkey and Case Study of Viniculture in Çanakkale Province]
    ," MPRA Paper 28832, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 May 2007.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28832
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28832/1/MPRA_paper_28832.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:kap:theord:v:83:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9598-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Alcalde, Jose, 1996. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 240-254, April.
    3. Klijn, Flip & Masso, Jordi, 2003. "Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 91-100, January.
    4. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
    5. Ergin, Haluk & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 215-237.
    6. José Alcalde & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2017. "Fair student placement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 293-307, August.
    7. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match," NBER Working Papers 14864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Molis, Elena, 2011. "Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-16, September.
    9. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
    10. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    11. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2011. "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 399-410, February.
    12. Alcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador, 1994. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(3), pages 417-435, May.
    13. Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, 2008. "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 669-689.
    14. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    15. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1974. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 441-443.
    16. Ehlers, Lars & Erdil, Aytek, 2010. "Efficient assignment respecting priorities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1269-1282, May.
    17. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 368-371, May.
    18. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
    19. Roth, Alvin E., 1982. "Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 127-132.
    20. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 639, Boston College Department of Economics.
    21. Alvin E. Roth & Uriel G. Rothblum, 1999. "Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 21-44, January.
    22. Tang, Qianfeng & Yu, Jingsheng, 2014. "A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 543-561.
    23. José Alcalde, 1994. "Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 275-287, December.
    24. Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2010. "The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 937-949, September.
    25. Morrill, Thayer, 2015. "Making just school assignments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 18-27.
    26. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
    27. José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2011. "Fair School Placement," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    28. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
    29. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-687.
    30. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    31. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-1978, December.
    32. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 717, Boston College Department of Economics.
    33. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
    34. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348.
    35. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    36. Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2000. "Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 91-105, March.
    37. Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agricultural Policy; Viniculture in Çanakkale; Turkey;

    JEL classification:

    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28832. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.