IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/13688.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Need for Greater Pro Active Involvement by Regulators in Financial Regulation and Supervision: Lessons From the Legal and General Case

Author

Listed:
  • Ojo, Marianne

Abstract

This paper considers the need for a more pro active approach which facilitates greater on site work being carried out by supervisors – as highlighted in the Legal and General Case. It also considers the recommendations made to the UK’s regulator - the FSA, and in particular to the FSA Board, following the Legal and General Case. The recommendations are compared to the Basel Committee’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. In drawing a comparison, the importance of independent verification of work carried out by external auditors, be it through on-site examinations or the use of external experts, is once again emphasised. The involvement of external auditors or other experts in the supervisory process should not relieve a regulator from on site supervisory responsibilities. As vital as an external auditor’s work is, it is also important to verify such work.

Suggested Citation

  • Ojo, Marianne, 2009. "The Need for Greater Pro Active Involvement by Regulators in Financial Regulation and Supervision: Lessons From the Legal and General Case," MPRA Paper 13688, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13688
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13688/1/MPRA_paper_13688.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Suzumura, Kotaro, 1999. "Paretian Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 204-220, April.
    2. Banerjee, Asis & Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1996. "A note on a property of maximal sets and choice in the absence of universal comparability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 191-195, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    pro active; monitoring; on-site; supervision; inspections;

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13688. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.