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Agreeing to Disagree with Multiple Priors


  • Andrés Carvajal

    () (CRETA and Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

  • João Correia-da-Silva

    () (CEF.UP and Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto)


We present an extension of Aumann's Agreement Theorem to the case of multiple priors. If agents update all their priors, then, for the Agreement Theorem to hold, it is sufficient to assume that they have closed, connected and intersecting sets of priors. On the other hand, if agents select the priors to be updated according to the maximum likelihood criterion, then, under these same assumptions, agents may still agree to disagree. For the Agreement Theorem to hold, it is also necessary to assume that the maximum likelihood priors are commonly known and not disjoint. To show that these hypotheses are necessary, we give several examples in which agents agree to disagree.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrés Carvajal & João Correia-da-Silva, 2010. "Agreeing to Disagree with Multiple Priors," FEP Working Papers 368, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
  • Handle: RePEc:por:fepwps:368

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    More about this item


    Agreeing to disagree; multiple priors; Aumann's Agreement Theorem;

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics

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