Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions
We evaluate a number of possible enhancements to the FCC auctions. We consider only changes to the current auction rules that stay within the basic format of the simultaneous multiple round auction for individual licenses. This report summarizes and extends our e-mail exchanges with FCC staff on this topic. A subsequent report will cover auctions with combination bids. Overall, the FCC spectrum auctions have been an enormous success. However, there are two design goals in the auction where important improvement can be achieved within the basic rules structure. These are restricting collusion among bidders and reducing the time taken to complete the auction. This report focuses on enhancements that help to achieve these two goals. Some of the suggested changes also streamline the auction process so large auctions can be conducted more quickly without sacrificing efficiency.
|Date of creation:||Sep 1997|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211|
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