Lessons from the United States Spectrum Auctions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: Prepared Testimony of Peter Cramton before the United States Senate Budget Committee, February 2000
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Abbink, Klaus & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Pezanis-Christou, Paul & Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & Selten, Reinhard, 2005.
"An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 505-530, February.
- Abbink, Klaus & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Pezanis-Christou, Paul & Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & Selten, Reinhard, 2001. "An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for the British 3G / UMTS Auction," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 25/2001, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Paul Pezanis-Christou & Bettina Rockenbach & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Reinhard Selten, 2007. "An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction," Post-Print hal-00279157, HAL.
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000385, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Chou, Yuntsai, 2014. "A compensation model developed to liberalize spectrum in the G4 era," 20th ITS Biennial Conference, Rio de Janeiro 2014: The Net and the Internet - Emerging Markets and Policies 106897, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
- Chou, Yuntsai & Hu, Weimin & Lien, Hsienming, 2015. "A compensation model developed to increase spectrum usage efficiency in the 4G era," 2015 Regional ITS Conference, Los Angeles 2015 146334, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
More about this item
Keywords
Auctions; Spectrum Auctions; Multiple Item Auctions;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-REG-2002-04-15 (Regulation)
Statistics
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