Policy Games, Distributional Conflicts and the Optimal Inflation (new version)
This paper shows that Limited Asset Market Participation generates an extra inflation bias when the fiscal and the monetary authority play strategically. A fully redistributive fiscal policy eliminates the extra inflation-bias, however, the latter is cancelled at the cost of reducing Ricardians' welfare. A fiscal authority which redistributes income only partially, reduces the inflation-bias, but rises Government spending. Despite a fully conservative monetary policy is necessary to get price stability, it implies a reduction in liquidity constrained consumers' welfare, in the absence of redistributive fiscal policies. Finally, under a crisis scenario price stability cannot be ensured by Ramsey without redistribution.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Via S. Felice, 5 - 27100 Pavia|
Web page: http://epmq.unipv.eu/site/home.html
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pav:demwpp:031. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alice Albonico)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.