IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/oxf/wpaper/9940.html

Money Burning and Stealing in the Laboratory: How Conflicting Ideologies Emerge

Author

Listed:
  • Zizzo, D.J.

Abstract

Three experiments on utility interdependence are discussed. Subjects receive money by betting and possibly by arbitrary assignments. They can then pay to reduce and, possibly, redistribute the steal money; in one case, only the decisions of a randomly determined dictator are implemented. The behavior of 80% of burners and redistributors was rank egalitarian. However, arbitrarily advantaged and disadvantaged subjects developed conflicting views of desert: arbitrarily disadvantaged subjects targeted arbitrarily assigned money; arbitrarily advantaged subjects did not care about how money was gained, and, if stealing was allowed, were twice as aggressive against earned money than against money assigned arbitrarily.

Suggested Citation

  • Zizzo, D.J., 2000. "Money Burning and Stealing in the Laboratory: How Conflicting Ideologies Emerge," Economics Series Working Papers 9940, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:9940
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Daniel J. Zizzo & Andrew J. Oswald, 2001. "Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others'Incomes?," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 63-64, pages 39-65.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:9940. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Anne Pouliquen The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Anne Pouliquen to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfeixuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.