IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osk/wpaper/0732r.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Endogenous Political Instability

Author

Listed:
  • Ryo Arawatari

    () (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

  • Kazuo Mino

    () (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

Abstract

In this paper, we construct a simple dynamic two-party electoral competition model in which the degree of political instability is endogenously determined. We consider the campaign contributions as stock variable which is gradually accumulated by both party fs direct investment and induced the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. We then examine the stability of the symmetric steady state and find that it may be either totally stable or unstable depending on the parameter values involved in the model. We also found that under certain conditions, at least near the symmetric steady state, there exists indeterminacy of equilibrium path: there exist both stable and unstable paths, that is, under given levels of political assets, both high instability political system and low instability political system can emerge depending on expectations of political parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryo Arawatari & Kazuo Mino, 2007. "Endogenous Political Instability," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-32-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised Nov 2007.
  • Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:0732r
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/0732R.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political assets; Dynamic political economy; Differential game; Markovperfect Nash equilibrium; Two-party model;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:0732r. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Atsuko SUZUKI). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/feosujp.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.