Dynamic Political Economy of Redistribution Policy: The Role of Education Costs
This paper focuses on how education costs affect the political determination of redistribution policy via individual decision-making on education. For cases of high costs, there are multiple equilibria: the high-tax equilibrium featured by the minority of highly educated individuals and a large size of the government, and the low-tax equilibrium featured by the majority of highly educated individuals and a small size of the government. For cases of low costs, there is a unique equilibrium featured by the majority of highly educated individuals and a large size of the government.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2007|
|Date of revision:||Nov 2007|
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- Markus Jäntti & Eva Österbacka & Oddbjörn Raaum & Tor Eriksson & Anders Björklund, 2002.
"Brother correlations in earnings in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden compared to the United States,"
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