Undevelopable Economies: Rethinking Development Through Institutional Dysfunction

This article introduces the concept of undevelopable economies—contexts in which development is not merely delayed or distorted, but structurally foreclosed due to persistent, self-reinforcing institutional dysfunction. While existing classifications such as “fragile,” “failing,” or “least developed” states suggest the potential for eventual progress, the notion of undevelopability challenges this assumption. It signals a qualitative shift: some institutional systems may be fundamentally resistant to transformation within prevailing development paradigms. The term is used diagnostically rather than deterministically. It highlights structural entrenchment—not cultural incapacity or societal failure—and draws attention to contexts where institutions function primarily to sustain elite power, suppress reform, and replicate dysfunction over time. Grounded in institutional theory, path dependence, and critical development scholarship, the paper advances this conceptual framework through case studies of Somalia, Haiti, and Venezuela—each illustrating a distinct mode of institutional foreclosure. It concludes by reflecting on the implications for aid architecture, donor strategy, and development theory. Recognizing undevelopability does not imply fatalism. Rather, it invites a more grounded, differentiated approach to theorizing development—one that acknowledges the political and historical limits of institutional change in fractured contexts, and reconsiders what is possible, ethical, and realistic in such environments.